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Abstract
Sargent (1999) warns that if policymakers’ views on the unemployment - inﬂation
tradeoff are driven by empirical correlations rather than theory, disinﬂations (escapes from
high to low inﬂation) may periodically occurr but are not bound to last. This paper asks how
different inﬂation objectives on the part of the policymaker affect this result. We show that
escapes in the neighborhood of zero inﬂation are less frequent and have a shorter duration as
policy objectives become more inﬂation-averse. A sufﬁciently (but not inﬁnitely) inﬂation-
averse policymaker never escapes Nash inﬂation and, on average, yields a lower inﬂation rate.
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After experiencing double-digit inﬂation during the seventies, most of the industrial
countries managed to return to low inﬂation rates. Understanding what caused these large
swings is essential to assessing whether low inﬂation will be sustained. Different hypotheses
have been formulated.
One is that after the seventies policymakers learned the natural rate hypothesis, put forth
by Friedman (1968) and others, and understood that the unemployment problem could not
be solved by means of sustained inﬂation. The spate of central bank reforms of the past
twenty years assigning a primary role to price stability as a statutory objective may stem from
governments’ understanding the expectational nature of the unemployment-inﬂation tradeoff
(e.g. Rogoff, 1985; Cukierman, 1994). This would suggest that high inﬂation is an evil of
the past. However, an alternative hypothesis on the ‘conquest’ of low inﬂation, formulated by
Sargent (1999), and Cho, Williams and Sargent (2001), offers a less reassuring perspective.
The ‘conquest’ hypothesis also relates policymakers’ decisions to disinﬂate to the
evolution of their views on the unemployment-inﬂation tradeoff, but it sees these views as
being driven by econometric estimates rather than theory. The ‘conquest’ model posits that the
government uses the available empirical evidence to measure the tradeoff, neglecting its true
expectational nature. It shows that the econometric practice of discounting past observations,
on the basis of a suspected parameter drift, causes the actual estimates to ﬂuctuate over time,
validating the initial hypothesis of parameter drift (even if there is no drift in the parameters
of the true data-generating process). Such a variability in coefﬁcient estimates translates
into policymakers’ changing views about the unemployment-inﬂation tradeoff, which in turn
causes policy ﬂuctuations.
1 The ‘conquest’ hypothesis thus suggests that today’s low inﬂation
rates are unlikely to persist, because of the weak nature of the learning process followed by
the policymaker (i.e. its reliance solely on estimates).
But the stylized setup of the ‘conquest’ model is mute about the effects of different
policy objectives on the inﬂation dynamics and the other outcomes of the model. We intend
1 When the estimated tradeoff is zero, the policymaker has an incentive to choose zero inﬂation, and an
endogenous disinﬂationary episode occurs. However, such a situation is unstable, because in the low-inﬂation
environment the policymaker is bound to “re-discover” a non-zero tradeoff between unemployment and inﬂation.
This makes it optimal to abandon the low-inﬂation policy in an attempt to lower unemployment.8
to investigate precisely this issue, and in doing so we are motivated by two considerations.
First, central banks have historically taken different attitudes towards inﬂation. Indeed, several
textbook explanations of heterogenous inﬂation records cite the role of policy objectives (e.g.
Cukierman, 1992 and Romer, 1996). Understanding whether policymakers with different
objectives are all equally prone to succumb to the statistical ‘illusions’ of an empirical Phillips
curve, as described by Cho, Williams and Sargent (2001), is useful in order to assess the
robustness of the conquest hypothesis. Second, monetary reforms of the past two decades, e.g.
the setup of independent central banks with a mandate of price stability, provide grounds to
presumethat monetary policy objectives havechangedin several countries sincetheseventies.
2
Since such reforms do not necessarily imply that the natural rate hypothesis was understood,
we ask whether a change in policy objectives affects the likelihood that high inﬂation might
return within the context of the ‘conquest’ model. We think this exercise is useful to assess
whether modern monetary institutions, endowed with a price-stability mandate, are just as
subject as their predecessors to the inﬂation risks identiﬁed by the ‘conquest’ model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic version of the ‘conquest’
hypothesis, following Cho, Williams and Sargent (2001). Section 3 analyzes how their results
are modiﬁed when policymakers have different degrees of aversion to inﬂation.
3 Section 4
summarizes the main ﬁndings of the analysis.
2. The ‘conquest’ hypothesis
2.1 The setup
The model is a version of the one-period economy used by Kydland and Prescott (1977).




2 In the past decade monetary reforms assigning explicit anti-inﬂation mandates were implemented in
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the twelve countries of the euro area. Cukierman (1998) reports
that twenty-ﬁve countries upgraded the legal independence of their central banks in the years since, compared
with only two in the previous forty years.
3 We exploited the Matlab (version 5.3) powerful Graphic User Interface to write a user-friendly code that
allows exercises on the ‘Conquest model’ to be replicated (and new ones explored) using intuitive click-on-
commands. The program can be downloaded freely from www.dadacasa.com/francesco_lippi or
obtained from the authors upon request (non-Matlab users may use a compiled version of the program which
runs from DOS).9
where E is the expectations operator, U and π denote, respectively, the unemployment rate
and inﬂation, and the parameter β indicates the relative weight attributed to inﬂa t i o nb yt h e
policymaker. In the experiments performed by Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams and Sargent
(2001), this parameter is assigned a unit value. We therefore set β =1in this section, where
the ‘escape’ argument is summarized, and analyze the role of different β values, i.e. different
monetary objectives, in the next section.
Unemployment is determined by the ‘expectations-augmented Phillips curve’:
U = U
∗ − θ(π − π
e)+v1 (2)
where U∗ is the (exogenous) ‘natural unemployment rate’, θ the Phillips curve slope, πe
denotes expected inﬂation and v1 is a zero-mean real shock with ﬁnite variance σv1, unknown
to both the government and the private sector. Actual inﬂation may deviate from the target
inﬂation rate, π∗, which is assumed to be controlled by the government, due to a zero-mean
control error v2 (with ﬁnite variance σv2):
π = π
∗ + v2 (3)




2.2 Equilibria with knowledge of model
Under the assumption that the government knows the true model of the economy, two
equilibria have been discussed in the literature: the Nash equilibrium and the Ramsey plan.
The former is the pair (π∗;πe) which solves the government problem of maximizing (1) with
respect to π∗ subject to (2) and (3) taking πe as given, which yields π∗ = πe = θU∗.
4 The
inﬂation and unemployment outcomes associated with this equilibrium are π = θU∗ + v2 and
U = U∗ − θv2 + v1.
Under the Ramsey plan, instead, the government maximizes (1) with respect to π∗
subject to (2), (3) and (4). Due to the additional constraint (4) the government internalizes
4 Recall that neither the government nor the private sector observes the realization of the shocks (v1 and v2).10
the effect of its decisions on private-sector expectations. This removes the incentive to create
‘surprise inﬂation’. The Ramsey plan yields π∗ = πe =0 . Note that while unemployment
is the same as under the Nash equilibrium, the inﬂation rate under Ramsey is π = v2,w h i c h
is smaller than the Nash outcome. As is well know since Kydland and Prescott (1977), the
(inefﬁciently) high inﬂation associated with the Nash equilibrium compared with the Ramsey
plan is due to the fact that the government fails to internalize the effect of its action on
expectations.
2.3 An approximating model: the self-conﬁrming equilibrium notion
When the government does not know the true structure of the economy, the model must
be enlarged to encompass government ‘beliefs’ about the true structure of the economy (see
Sims, 1988 and Sargent, 1999): two different models come into play, the true one (data-
generating model) and the one perceived by the government, sometimes referred to as the
‘approximating’ model.
In Cho, Williams and Sargent (2001) this means that the government does not know
equations (2), (3), (4), and instead uses an approximating model that posits a structural
relationship between unemployment and realized inﬂation alone. The approximating model
is thus restricted to belong to the following family of curves:
Ut = γ0 + γ1πt + εt (5)
where γ0, γ1 are coefﬁcients to be determined and εt is a random term orthogonal to the
constant and to πt. Thus, the policymaker approximating model is misspeciﬁed, as it fails to
recognize the existence of a shifter parameter (the expectations of the private sector, πe) that
positions the Phillips curve (2).





. The policy problem








The model is closed by requiring beliefs (γ) to satisfy a ‘rationality requirement’. In this
context, where there exist two models, the equilibrium notion requires the ‘wrong’ model to11
be indistinguishable from the correct one in equilibrium. This leads to the ‘self-conﬁrming
equilibrium’ (SCE) notion. In an SCE, the beliefs are the ones that best conform to the
moments of the observable data. The ‘self-conﬁrming’ element of the equilibrium lies in
the fact that beliefs feed back to determine the moments of the data that are observed. The
moment condition is thus self-referential: government equilibrium beliefs imply behavior that
produces data whose moment matrices conﬁrm such beliefs.
5 In the model, such a form of







which identiﬁes γ as the population least square regression vector. Thus, government beliefs
are driven by the best statistical ﬁt of the data within the class of models considered.
Sargent (1999) shows that the above speciﬁcation has a unique self-conﬁrming
equilibrium under which inﬂation and unemployment coincide with the Nash outcomes.
6
Moreover, under aconventional learning scheme such as the least squares estimation of (5), the
learning process on γ eventually converges on point estimates that satisfy the SCE condition.
Thus, if the policymaker estimates (5) using ordinary least squares, the model predicts that, in
the long run (i.e. after the learning process has converged), the economy will converge to the
Nash equilibrium and remain there afterwards.
7
2.4 Suspecting parameter drift: the emergence of ﬂuctuations
Cho, Williams and Sargent (2001) show that the suspicion of parameter drift on the part
of the government may break such a convergence result.
Parameter drift leads the government to replace least square estimation with a method
that discounts past observations (i.e. a‘ﬁxed-gainscheme’). Cho, Williamsand Sargent(2001)
show how this instance also has a self-conﬁrming ﬂavor: if the government discounts past
observations on the basis of a suspected parameter drift, actual estimates will oscillate over
5 A little more formally, economic outcomes, X, depend on the government beliefs (γ), via government
best response π∗ = h(γ) and the data generating process T(), i.e. X = T(h(γ)). Government beliefs, in turn,
depend on economic outcomes via equation (7), γ = G(X). A self-conﬁrming equilibrium solves the ﬁxed point
problem γ = G(T(h(γ))).







7 However, convergence to such an equilibrium may be extremely slow (see Sims, 1988).12
time. Thus the (incorrect) hypothesis of parameter drift appears validated even if there is no
drift in the parameters of the true data-generating process. This result has an important policy
implication: because coefﬁcient estimates ﬂuctuate, policymakers’ beliefs on the inﬂation-
unemployment tradeoff change over time, leading to changing inﬂation policies.
The authors provide a characterization of these ﬂuctuations showing that, under a ﬁxed-
gain scheme, the learning process is subject to recurrent episodes of slow convergence toward
the SCE and rapid escapes from it towards the zero inﬂa t i o nR a m s e yo u t c o m e . T h e s e
‘escape dynamics’always push thesystem toward an outcome associated with the policymaker
discovering too strong a version of the natural rate hypothesis. In fact, during these episodes
the government is led to believe that γ1 is almost nil, implying that there is no tradeoff between
inﬂation and output, while in reality a short run impact exists.
The key mechanism triggering the escape dynamics is a movement in π∗ (the target level
of inﬂation chosen by the government) which translates one-to-one into movements of πe,t h e
expectational parameter in the true data-generating process (DGP henceforth). It is only when
π∗, and thus πe, start moving around as a result of a particularly unusual sequence of shocks in
the DGP, that the policymaker observes data points (Ut, πt) that tend to steepen the estimated
Phillips curve (EPC henceforth), making the perceived tradeoff less favorable to exploit.
Figure1 helpsusillustratehowan escapefrom theneighborhoodofhigh(Nash)inﬂation
towards zero (Ramsey) inﬂation may happen. Let us consider a situation as the one illustrated
by epc1 and dgp1 in the ﬁgure. Here the estimated Phillips curve coincides with the true
DGP. This is the situation that obtains in an SCE: the expectation parameter πe
1 (and the policy
variable, π∗
1) are set at the Nash equilibrium level πe
1 = π∗
1 = θU∗, the estimated slope of the
Phillips curve (the inverse of the slope depicted in the ﬁgure) is γ1 = −θ. The data points
are clustered around the two overlapping loci epc1 and dgp1. Now suppose that a sequence of
sufﬁciently large shocks occurs, and that it is inﬂuential enough to move the estimated slope
of the Phillips curve in either direction.
8 Suppose, to consider a counter-intuitive case, that the
new data tend to ﬂatten the estimated Phillips curve. A ﬂattening of the curve means a more
favorable tradeoff, which leads the government to raise its target inﬂation rate from π∗
1 to π∗
2.
Since the private sector has rational expectations, the shifter parameter in the DGP moves from
8 Here is where the discounting of past observations (i.e. a ﬁxed-gain algorithm) is crucial, as it gives the
new data sufﬁcient leverage to change the accumulated evidence. This does not happen under least squares.13
πe
1 to πe
2, shifting the true DGP upwards, to dgp2. Now the clouds of points generated by the
true model are around dgp2, above the old cloud: note that this effect steepens the estimate
of the Phillips curve slope, γ1. A steeper tradeoff, in turn, leads to a downward revision of
π∗ (and πe), say to π∗
3. Note how the data that are generated by this new DGP (below the
old ones) contribute to a further steepening of the estimated tradeoff. When such a process is
started, a few iterations lead the policymaker to believe the Phillips curve is almost vertical.
The perceived absence of a tradeoff makes (almost) zero inﬂation a best response (see 6). At
this point policy is near the Ramsey outcome, the (time inconsistent) level of inﬂation. But
such an ‘escape’ is not bound to last. As new data accumulate around dgp3 (and old data are
discounted) the existence of a short-run tradeoff is (re)discovered. A slow process of upward
revisions in γ1, converging towards its unique SCE value of −θ, will accompany a gradual rise
in inﬂation.
9
Sargent (1999) uses the ‘conquest’ model as a parable of the US inﬂation history after
the Second World War. In his view, the steady increase in inﬂation, from 1965 until 1980, can
be seen as an episode of convergence towards the SCE-Nash level of inﬂation: as policymakers
measured an apparently exploitable unemployment-inﬂation tradeoff, they tried to use it, and
inﬂation increased. Disinﬂation (i.e. the rapid escape from high inﬂation towards the Ramsey
outcome) came when the data ceased to reveal an exploitable tradeoff.
3. The role of policy objectives
The dismal message of the ‘conquest’ hypothesis is that the errors of the past will be
repeated in the future. Government beliefs based on statistical estimates are not acquired
for good. This might explain why at the end of the seventies the Phillips curve had almost
disappeared, whereas today a number of policymakers and academics are noticing that the
Phillips curve is ‘alive and well’. The risk is that governments might be tempted to exploit the
tradeoff.
How worrying is that warning? Are all governments (or central bankers) equally bound
to fall victims to such statistical illusions? The hypothesis that policymakers learned the
9 To see the dynamics which underlie Figure 4.1 the interested reader can use our click-on Matlab program
(see footnote 3). This allows users to visualize the evolution of the estimated tradeoff and the actual one (DGP)
during the relevant phases of a simulation (e.g. escapes), observation after observation.14
‘natural rate hypothesis’ seems at odds with the continued use of econometric estimates of
the unemployment-inﬂation ‘tradeoffs’ by most central banks.
10
While it is difﬁcult to ascertain whether policymakers learned the natural rate hypothesis
after the seventies, something is known about the monetary reforms implemented since then
with the aim of making monetary policy more committed to ﬁghting inﬂation. Several central
banks have been given independence and a mandate to pursue price stability (Cukierman,
1998), and have displayed behavior consistent with a greater aversion to inﬂa t i o nt h a ni nt h e
seventies (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000). A worldwide trend towards more inﬂation-averse
central banks prompts us to ask how the warning of the conquest model is affected when
central banks are given objectives which are more (but not inﬁnitely) averse to inﬂation.
We do this by means of a simple modiﬁcationof the original model. Whilethe parameter
β, weighting inﬂation and unemployment in the government objectives, is equal to one in the
original setting, we analyze the consequences of different β values (a low value identiﬁes a
policymaker primarily concerned with output ﬂuctuations, see equation (1)). For the sake of
brevity we follow Rogoff (1985) and refer to β as ‘conservatism’. For comparability with the
results of Sargent (1999) and Chow, Williams and Sargent (2001), all other parameter settings
in our simulations coincide with theirs.
11
3.1 Conservatism and the frequency of escapes
The ﬁrst question we investigate is whether escapes (from the neighborhood of the
Nash equilibrium towards the zero inﬂation) are more or less frequent when conservatism
is greater.
12
10 Sargent (1999) notes that “the method survived and prospered within the Federal Reserve System”.
11 We also conducted some robustness experiments by replicating the simulations in other points of the
parameter space, namely changing the ratio of the two standard deviations σv2/σv1. Our results on the role of β
do not change qualitatively in a signiﬁcant way as σv2/σv1 changes.
12 A ﬁrst issue to address in answering this question concerns the escape deﬁnition. Cho, Williams and
Sargent (2001) deﬁne an escape in the space of inﬂation outcomes (i.e. when actual inﬂation π gets “sufﬁciently
close” to zero). But, as (8) shows, the desired inﬂation rate π∗, and thus realized inﬂation π, depend directly on
β in our case and correspondingly the SCE/Nash equilibrium level of inﬂation varies as β varies. This makes it
inappropriate to choose a threshold value of π∗ (or π) above which an escape begins. To avoid this problem, we
deﬁne an escape in the γ1 space, whose range of variation is not dependent on β.
Thus, we deﬁne an escape to begin when γ1 is above γin
1 (−1 < γin
1 < 0) and that escape to end when γ1
drops below γout
1 (−1 < γout
1 ≤ γin
1 < 0). By making γout
1 < γin
1 we prevent the algorithm from counting “too
many” escapes due to minor ﬂuctuations in γ1. In practice, we set γout
1 = −0.25 and γin
1 = −0.20.15
At ﬁrst blush, it might be supposed that more conservative policymakers are relatively
more willing to shoot for low inﬂation and learn ‘too strong’ a version of the natural rate
hypothesis. But this is not thecase. As β increases, theresults of the simulations reveal that the
occurrenceofan escape becomes lessfrequent, as shown in the second column ofTable 1. This
indicates that an endogenous disinﬂation episode becomes less likely as more conservative
central bankers are appointed to ofﬁce. For the parameter set used by Cho, Williams and
Sargent (2001), the frequency of escapes becomes almost nil as β approches 5.
To understand this result, recall howthereaction function of the policymaker(6) changes







This formula gives the optimal inﬂation level chosen by the policymaker in each period,
given its current estimate of the tradeoff. Recall that variation in π∗ is the key ingredient
needed to trigger an escape. The high inﬂation aversion of such a central banker translates,
via equation (8) above, into choices of π∗ that are tightly clustered around each other. This
can be seen by noting that, for a given change in beliefs, i.e. the vector of variation [dγ0
dγ1], the amplitude of the resulting adjustment in π∗ is decreasing in β.
13 This dampens the
vertical displacements in the true data-generating process (recall that πe = π∗). In essence, a
more conservative central banker has smaller incentives to adjust the inﬂation rate in response
to a changing tradeoff. Less variation in the desired inﬂation policy makes it less likely to
discover that the estimated tradeoff is vertical, since the vertical displacements of the true
data-generating process are less pronounced. As a result, escapes are less frequent.
3.2 Conservatism and the duration of escapes
In spite of the fact that more conservative policymakers are less prone to discover a
‘strong version’ of the natural rate hypothesis, it might be supposed that once they escape
Nash inﬂation their strong inﬂation aversion would make them more willing to sustain low
inﬂation, i.e. to remain longer in the neighborhood of zero inﬂation. On the contrary, in
addition to escaping less frequently, conservative central bankers also spend less time around
the Ramsey outcome once they reach it. The third column of Table 1 reports the duration of
13 Note from (8) that both partial derivatives of π∗ with respect to γ0 and γ1 tend to zero as β →∞ .16
an escape, measured by the number of periods during which the estimated unemployment-
inﬂation tradeoff remains ‘almost zero’ provided an escape has occurred.
14
As β increases from β =0 .2 to β =4 , the escape duration decreases by a factor of
10. This effect reinforces and cumulates with that concerning the frequency of escapes. Both
effects make a period of almost-zero inﬂation implemented by a conservative policymaker
(who mistakenly believes there is no unemployment-inﬂation tradeoff) a rare event. The
combined result of these effects is reported in the fourth column of Table 1, which shows
the number of periods in a simulation (given by the number of escapes times their duration)
during which the policymaker measures a non-exploitable tradeoff as a ratio over the length of
that simulation. When β =0 .2, the policymaker believes that γ1 is near zero more than half
of the times; the same event occurs less than 1 percent of the times for β greater than 4.
3.3 Conservatism and average inﬂation
Wejustshowedthataconservativepolicymakerisbothlesslikelytodisinﬂatealltheway
to zero and less willing to sustain Ramsey inﬂation whenever he gets there. Thus, somewhat
paradoxically, less conservative policymakers are more likely to implement near zero inﬂation
than more conservative policymakers. The latter, on the other hand, yield lower inﬂation
rates under the Nash equilibrium, near which they ﬂoat most of their time. Therefore, the last
question we ask is whether these results are enough to deliver an average performance in terms
of attained inﬂation (over a long period of time) that penalizes the conservative central banker.
Changes in the policymaker’s aversion to inﬂation affect average inﬂation through three
distinct channels: two were discussed in the previous two subsections; the third, working in the
opposite direction, is immediate from (8): a more conservative central banker chooses lower
inﬂation rates (π∗). Figure2 showsthatthis lasteffectdominates: aclearlynegativecorrelation
exists between the average inﬂation rate and central bank conservatism. This result indicates
that averageinﬂa tio nisd r i v e nb yt h eN a shi n ﬂation outcome(which is decreasing inβ)de spi te
the existence of (possibly) substantial deviations from that focal point. Having a conservative
policymaker remains an effective way to bring inﬂa t i o nd o w ne v e ni nt h i sm o d e la n di ns p i t e
of the fact that he will choose zero inﬂation less often than less conservative policymakers.
14 The duration is computed as follows: provided an escape has begun (i.e. that the estimated γ1 climbs
above the threshold value γin
1 = −0.2), the algorithm counts for how many periods the estimated γ remains
“near zero”, i.e. above the threshold value γout
1 = −0.25 (see footnote 12).17
4. Concluding remarks
A recentinterpretation of inﬂationdynamicsaftertheSecondWorldWar, ﬁrstarticulated
by Sargent (1999), suggests that recurrent oscillations between high and low inﬂation may be
produced by policymakers who ignore the expectational nature of the unemployment-inﬂation
tradeoff. One attractive feature of this interpretation is that the empirical relation between
unemployment and inﬂation remains an important one in policy discussions. This justiﬁes
doubting the idea that policymakers believe in the natural rate hypothesis. The interpretation
ﬂashes a warning about the potential inﬂationary risks associated with such a policy behavior.
Low inﬂation may occur when the data do not reveal an exploitable unemployment-inﬂation
tradeoff, but such a situation is not bound to last.
The above warning deserves attention, particularly at a time when statistical Phillips-
curvetyperelationsseem to beenjoying revived interestamong academics andpolicymakers.
15
We therefore examined its solidity without denying its premise, i.e. the ignorance of the
expectational nature of the tradeoff. Rather, we adhere to the setup of Sargent (1999) and Cho,
Williams and Sargent (2001) and construct a slightly more general version of their model,
which allows different policy objectives to be considered. In particular, in comparison with
their analysis, our model allows one to analyze how different degrees of inﬂation aversion
on the part of the policymaker affect the warning. Policy objectives are important because
monetary authorities have historically shown different attitudes towards inﬂation. Moreover,
monetary reforms in the recent past have made price stability the main policy objective of
several central banks. Such reforms are suggested as a cure for high inﬂation by standard
economic theory in which the policymaker is assumed to know the structure of the economy
(e.g. Rogoff, 1985). Butwhatifthemodelisnotproperlyspeciﬁed? Wouldsuchreformsallow
inﬂation to be controlled? To answer this question, we investigated how different inﬂation
objectives affect the predictions of the conquest model.
Our results show that the statistical illusions to which policymakers succumb in the
analysis of Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams and Sargent (2001) are less likely to occur when
policymakers are more inﬂation averse, because conservative policymakers are less willing to
move inﬂation away from target to reduce unemployment, even when the data suggest that
15 See the 1999 special issue of the Journal of Monetary Economics, “The Return of the Phillips Curve”,
e d i t e db yR . G .K i n ga n dC . I .P l o s s e r .18
such a policy is feasible. By generating much less variability in inﬂation, they annihilate the
spark that triggers the escapes. Somewhat paradoxically, this implies that less conservative
policymakers, being relatively more prone to generate inﬂation variability, are more likely to
hit zero inﬂation than conservative ones. But despite such episodes, which are infrequent and
relatively short lived, the average inﬂation rate is lower for more conservative policymakers.
This suggests that, even within the context of the conquest model, a conservative policymaker
provides an effective way to reduce inﬂation in lasting fashion.Tables and ﬁgures
Table 1
Features of ’Escapes’ as β varies
β value Frequencya
(percentage ratio)
Duration of an escapeb
(number of periods)
% time believing
that γ1 is near zero
0.2 0.43 (.05) 138 (19) 58.7
0.5 0.24 (.04) 118 (18) 28.3
0.7 0.21 (.04) 119 (20) 24.0
1 0.20 (.04) 107 (20) 20.6
1.5 0.20 (.04) 83 (14) 16.3
2.0 0.20 (.04) 60 (11) 11.8
2.5 0.18 (.04) 40 (9) 7.0
3.0 0.13 (.04) 27 (8) 3.3
3.5 0.08 (.04) 18 (10) 1.4
4.0 0.05 (.04) 13 (10) 0.6
4.5 0.04 (.04) 11 (10) 0.3
Notes: Numbers in the table are averages calculated over 500 simulations for each value of beta (each simulation
lasts 10,000 periods). Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.
aThe frequency of escapes is deﬁned as the percentage ratio between the average number of escapes observed
in a simulation and the total number of periods in that simulation (e.g. the frequency value 0.24, associated to
beta=0.5, indicates that on average 24 escapes are observed over 10,000 periods in a simulation where beta=0.5).
bThe duration of an escape is the average number of periods during which the estimated slope of the tradeoff
remains greater than the threshold value -0.25 provided an escape has started (i.e. the estimated slope is greater
than -0.20; see footnotes 12 and 14 for more details).Figure 1
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